Canadian Debate Intensifies Over Proposed Foreign Influence Registry
Over the past two years, discussions concerning potential political interference from Beijing have escalated in Ottawa. With the Canadian parliament set to reconvene after the summer recess, expectations are high for the introduction of a foreign influence registry bill before the year’s end. This proposal has garnered both support and contention, shedding light on the deep-rooted concerns and divides among Chinese-Canadians and its broader implications on political careers.
In a bid to address potential overseas electoral interference and intimidation, two distinct petitions have been brought forth. In April, a citizens’ petition championed by centre-left Liberal Party MP Chandra Arya argued against the creation of the registry, deeming it a potentially misleading tool to detect foreign influence. Conversely, the following month, a petition backed by New Democratic Party MP Jenny Kwan called on the government to swiftly establish the registry, emphasizing its crucial role in preserving Canadian democratic values.
These petitions, both amassing thousands of signatures, signify the complexity of the issue at hand, with concerns straddling both sides of the political spectrum. Some Chinese-Canadians believe the registry would serve as a shield for public figures and dissidents from Beijing’s undue influence. However, others express apprehensions that the registry might inadvertently stifle genuine engagements with Chinese individuals and hinder civil discourse on a broader scale.
Unlike its neighbor to the south, Canada does not have an analog to the United States’ Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), an act in effect since 1938. While FARA has seen its controversies, there’s been a growing call to bolster it, especially in the wake of reported foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.
In 2022, confidential information from Canada’s national security apparatus began making rounds in the media. Reports from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) divulged attempts by Chinese agents to sway election results and suppress Beijing’s critics. Following one such leak in May, a Chinese diplomat was expelled from Ottawa after accusations of spying on Michael Chong, a Conservative Party MP and a vocal detractor of Beijing’s human rights record. Subsequent reports affirmed that Chong was the subject of a likely Beijing-fueled misinformation campaign on the social platform WeChat.
The repercussions of these leaks have been profound. In March, Han Dong, a Liberal Party MP, faced allegations of communicating with a Chinese consular official to postpone the release of two Canadians, arrested in the aftermath of Canada’s detention of Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou. Despite backing from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Dong departed the party and initiated a libel lawsuit against broadcaster Global News.
China’s purported interference in Canadian politics predates these leaks. Relations between the two nations have been tense, particularly after the arrest episode involving Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou and the subsequent detention of two Canadians in China.
In 2021, Conservative MP Kenny Chiu proposed a bill for a “foreign influence registry.” This would mandate individuals acting for “foreign principals” (excluding diplomats) to inform Ottawa of any engagements with public officials or discussions about legislative agendas. However, Chiu’s re-election bid faltered, with him attributing his defeat to a disinformation campaign propelled by Beijing-affiliated entities. Chiu’s legislation did not survive, but a similar proposal was presented by Conservative Senator Leo Housakos in the subsequent year. March saw then-Minister of Public Safety Marco Mendicino instigate a public discourse on the registry’s creation, laying groundwork for a potential legislative approval.
June witnessed a protest against the registry in Ottawa, supported by Conservative senator Victor Oh and independent senator Yuen Pau Woo. The demonstration was subsequent to a ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of Canada’s 1923 Chinese Immigration Act. Senator Woo voiced concerns that the registry might inadvertently echo past discriminatory policies. He emphasized the risk of wrongly assuming that individuals sharing views with the Chinese government are automatically Beijing’s puppets, which could potentially diminish the participation of Chinese-Canadians in democratic processes.
Senator Woo highlighted existing Canadian laws that partially address intimidation or covert actions by Beijing. He proposed bolstering these existing laws rather than creating a new registry. However, if a registry’s introduction is inevitable, Woo advocated for its scope to be limited to tangible cases of foreign influence, such as monetary incentives, rather than vague signs like arranging meetings with foreign officials.
The contours of Canada’s forthcoming foreign influence registry, encompassing its targeted countries and activities, are currently in the works and remain shrouded in uncertainty. Advocates for the registry, including active members of pro-democracy groups within the Chinese-Canadian community, assert that its primary goal is not to stifle political activities but rather to enhance their transparency. They often draw parallels to similar registries in the United States and Australia, which extend their coverage beyond lobbying officials to encompass activities such as public relations and require registration for unpaid involvements.
Canadian Senator Yuen Pau Woo expressed his concern that the registry might lead to assumptions that individuals with views even vaguely aligned with a foreign perspective are acting as agents of that foreign entity. He emphasized that this could undermine healthy debates and discourage political participation among Chinese-Canadians. Woo advocated for strengthening existing Canadian laws, which already address intimidation or covert interference by Beijing, as an alternative to creating a new registry. However, he suggested that if a registry becomes inevitable, it should focus on cases with tangible indicators of foreign influence, such as financial benefits, rather than relying on ambiguous signs like arranging meetings with foreign officials.
Michael Chong, a Conservative MP and his party’s lead foreign policy critic, argued that a registry dedicated to authoritarian states, distinct from lobbying disclosures, is essential because authoritarian regimes possess tactics that private corporations lack. Chong emphasized that the primary purpose of the registry is to hold accountable those who act corruptly, coercively, and clandestinely on behalf of Beijing within Canada.
While some individuals like Cheuk Kwan, co-chair of the Toronto Association for Democracy in China, expressed disappointment in the false equivalency drawn between the Chinese Exclusion Act and the proposed registry, he stressed that the registry is intended to apply to people of all racial backgrounds, rather than singling out Chinese-Canadians.
On the other hand, Ivan Pak, co-founder of the Stop Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Advocacy Group, opposed the registry not on racial grounds but due to concerns about potential confusion and the politicization of foreign interference accusations without substantial evidence. Pak noted that Chinese immigrants have become hesitant to engage in politics due to pressure from both sides, fearing targeting by both the Canadian government and Beijing.
Derek H., a Chinese resident of Vaughan, Ontario, expressed concerns about the impact of the registry on benign activities conducted by Chinese hometown organizations. He explained that these organizations often invite Canadian parliamentarians to gatherings with visiting Chinese government officials, which do not involve advocacy or specific requests. Many Chinese-Canadians, Derek noted, have mixed feelings toward China and may vote for candidates who are not staunchly anti-China because they want China to succeed, even if they disapprove of the Chinese government’s actions.
Experts noted that Beijing seeks to exploit this natural affinity within the Chinese diaspora, making solutions to these complex issues challenging. Charles Burton, a fellow at the Ottawa-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute, highlighted how Chinese diplomatic missions and the United Front Work Department, an organ of the Chinese Communist Party, work to influence and shape perceptions within the Chinese diaspora.
The proposed foreign influence registry represents just one facet of Ottawa’s response to reported Chinese interference. In March, Canada initiated an investigation into Chinese electoral interference, concluding that several allegations, including those against Han Dong, were unsupported or false. However, David Johnston, the former governor general of Canada and special rapporteur for the investigation, resigned after releasing his initial report, citing a politically charged atmosphere surrounding his work. Meanwhile, some Chinese diaspora groups and opposition party leaders accused Johnston of bias toward the Liberal Party and called for a public inquiry into foreign election interference, which the government subsequently announced.
A March survey conducted by polling company Leger found that concerns voiced by diaspora groups are not isolated incidents. The survey revealed that 36 percent of Chinese-Canadians believe allegations of China’s attempts to influence Canadian elections are valid, and 51 percent are concerned about Beijing’s pressure on the political activities of the Chinese community. Interestingly, 52 percent of Chinese-Canadians agree with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s assertion that suggesting Canadian politicians of Chinese descent might be influenced by Beijing constitutes a form of “anti-Asian racism.”
Senator Woo emphasized that he is more concerned about the emergence of a “new racism” that forces Chinese-Canadians to choose between being seen as a “good Chinese-Canadian” who denounces China and severs ties or a “bad Chinese-Canadian” who maintains connections and is considered a potential security risk.
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